SUMMARY  OF  THE  TALO  DAM

The Djenne Mosque may be jeopardized by the construction of the Talo Dam.

Below is a summary of The Talo Dam Project, conducted by IDCE's director, Professor William Fisher, along with two recent IDCE graduate students, Lisa Meierotto and Ryan Russell.  The Talo Dam Project is an excellent example of the kind of research that Clark faculty and students both benefit from and share for the benefit of all.  Please review the summary below, and click here to open and print a complete copy of The Talo Dam Project report.

The Talo Dam Project Report 

Executive Summary

As the World Commission on Dams Executive Summary has noted:  “At the heart of the dams debate are issues of equity, governance, justice, and power.” This report focuses on these issues in light of the Talo Dam Project [1], highlighting the concerns of various stakeholders and affected populations. Based on available evidence, we believe that the project should not move forward, or at the very least not do so until all of the recommended measures and transformational changes outlined below have occurred.  

Our concerns with the project can be divided into three distinct geographical regions: the target area, the upstream area, and downstream. Each region has distinct issues and interests that need to be considered separately, as well as in relation to each other, and as a whole.  Numerous stakeholders are involved in varying capacities in the project, including the African Development Bank, Government of Mali, local communities, and larger civil society – consisting of local, regional, and international actors.  The main body of the report focuses on concerns raised by each of the above stakeholders in addition to concerns identified by the Clark Research Team. 

Significant topics inadequately considered by the AfDB can be summarized as follows:  

Project Concerns: 

    1.  Calculations of total cost vs. total benefits from the project are incomplete and need to be reconsidered. Total costs should include the loss of downstream agricultural, grazing and fishing and the loss of 11,000 hectares of grazing lands in the target area.  Climatic variability such as low rainfall will likely reduce projected outputs.  Additionally, there are concerns over distribution of benefits. Who will gain and who will lose, and how will total benefits be spread among community members? 

    2.  Similar irrigation schemes have failed in Mali due to poor management and coordination. That this project largely follows the model of failed predecessors raises serious concerns about its prospects for success. The 1997 EIA describes the project as the most complex irrigation project in Mali, yet no investment has been made in building the capacity to manage and maintain the project. Local, regional, and national responsibilities, as well as accountability, are unclear. 

    3.  The AfDB states that only 6% of the Bani River will be diverted annually for irrigation in the target area. From our hydrological analysis, we find that number misleading, as up to 20% of the river will be diverted while the reservoir is filling during the rainy season.  This will deprive downstream communities of much-needed floodwaters at a critical time for rice and agricultural production. Furthermore, the occurrence of a dry hydrological year (i.e. a year with minimal precipitation) would significantly increase the impact of the reservoir on surrounding and downstream communities and ecosystems.    

    4.  The 1995 EIA suggested that up to 15,500 people could face relocation in the submersion area. To alleviate this problem, they suggested building an eighty-kilometer dike following the left bank of the reservoir. The 1997 EIA, commissioned by the AfDB in response to 1995 findings contained a new survey of topographical and hydrological data from the left bank of the upstream area. This study found that only one village was at serious risk of flooding, and as such the AfDB need only build a thirty-five kilometer dike along the left bank of the Bani upstream from dam to Wori.  However, from the 1997 Agrer EIA, we believe the potential flooding of villages further upstream due to hydrological changes brought about by the dam still exists, and as such a contingency plan for these villages should exist.  Such a plan would provide resources or assistance in case of flooding or undesired changes in agricultural activities.

Project Omissions:

   1.  Environmental and socio-economic impacts of this project on the downstream area were completely excluded in all stages of project design and planning.  The cost/benefit analysis completely neglected all downstream effects.  AfDB and WCD guidelines clearly dictate that downstream communities must be considered in project conception and design.  

   2.  The project documents fail to adequately consider ecological and systemic impacts. The transformation of a seasonal river into a continuously flowing river will radically transform the riparian ecosystem. Generations of families, flora and fauna depend on the annual rise and fall of the Bani. The Bani River is a part of the larger Niger Inland Delta region.  As the Niger’s major tributary, the Bani River is a part of larger system, and cannot be viewed in isolation. 

   3.  Alternative development strategies were not considered at any point during project planning.  The WCD has highlighted the importance of exploring alternative irrigation and development strategies.  There is no evidence that alternatives to the dam were considered by the AfDB or Government of Mali. 

Based on available evidence and documentation, our research team cannot support the assertion that this project is an appropriate development strategy.  In our judgment, the following information is needed:

1. An Environmental Impact Assessment and socio-economic study focusing on the downstream area (from the dam to Mopti).

2. An Environmental Impact Assessment focusing on potential effects of the Talo Dam on the greater Niger Inland Delta.

3. A revised cost-benefit analysis of potential losses that includes both downstream and upstream costs or losses, in addition to projected project benefits.

4. A comprehensive hydrological study taking into account the amount of water to be diverted from the Bani River, including losses due to factors such as evaporation.  This study must consider climatic variability and not solely rely on yearly averages.

Two obvious conclusions are of considerable consequence.  First, consultations with affected communities were far below current international standards of acceptability.  Local communities, especially those downstream, were not invited nor encouraged to participate in the design and planning of this project. This failure is contrary to the policies of the African Development Bank, and ignores World Commission on Dams guidelines. Second, the failure to explore alternative irrigation strategies raises questions about the appropriateness of the Talo Project. Had these issues been included from the moment of inception, the Talo Dam project would have greater credibility.

The Bani River is constantly in a state of change.  Every year it overflows its banks and transforms the Niger Inland Delta into a vast floodplain. At least a half a million people of diverse cultural backgrounds, migrating birds, and fish all depend on it.  The entire riparian ecosystem lives according to its rise and fall.  Drought and climate change are already affecting the river, as its flow is decreasing every year.  The Talo Dam, at 5 meters high and 700 meters long will change the river in new and uncertain ways. The AfDB ought to conduct a more thorough review of environmental and socio-economic impacts before proceeding with this project.

Waterfront in Mali

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